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Nowadays many monetary authorities actively use communication as an instru-
ment of monetary policymaking. Theoretically, communication may have little
value added if the central bank credibly commits to a policy rule. For, if the
public forms expectations rationally, the systematic part of policy will be de-
duced from the central bank's actions (see Woodford (2006)). Thus, when it
comes to predicting interest rate decisions, it would be su±cient to interpret
(forecasts of) economic data in view of the central bank's policy rule. However,
most central banks do not adhere to a ¯xed rule. For example, Kohn and Sack
(2004) describe how for the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) `decisions involve considerable judgement and °exibility ... thus pol-
icy actions at any given time may be di±cult to predict (p. 189)'. Likewise,
president Trichet of the European Central Bank (ECB) has repeatedly stressed
that the ECB takes its decisions one step at a time.1 Therefore, by commenting
on expected economic developments or by giving hints, the central bank may
in°uence the ¯nancial markets' expectations of upcoming interest rate decisions.
Indeed, there is increasing evidence that central bank communication has e®ects
on ¯nancial markets.2
That the words of central bankers are considered to be relevant is also illus-
trated by the importance of `central bank watching': ¯nancial markets devote
vast amounts of time and energy to predicting future policy decisions on the
basis of the central bank's current actions and statements. Central banks may
use various channels for their communications: regular publications (like In°a-
1For example, in the Q&A session after the interest rate decision on 2 March 2006, Trichet
answered: `We do not engage a priori in a series of interest rate hikes...we do not pre-commit
ourselves unconditionally'.
2See, for instance, Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) or Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006).
1tion Reports), congressional or parliamentary testimony, speeches, interviews,
press conferences or statements after policy decisions and press releases. For
economic agents, it is important to understand which of these channels is useful
for predicting future policy decisions.3
This paper studies how useful one particular form of ECB communication,
to wit statements by high-level policymakers, has been for predicting its interest
rate decisions. First, we study whether this type of communication has been
informative at all. Second, we consider how models based on central bank talk
compare to models based on macroeconomic variables, such as in°ation and the
output gap. In all cases, we use ordered probit models based on the Taylor rule
(see Taylor (1993)). The policy comments which we use are made by euro area
central bankers in the form of interviews, speeches and press conferences during
the ¯rst years of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).4
Our results are as follows. Statements by euro area central bankers on
the main re¯nancing rate and future in°ation are signi¯cantly related to ECB
policy decisions. In that sense, comments by central bankers are helpful for
understanding interest rate decisions. However, communication-based models
do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in predicting interest
3For example, Pakko (2005) ¯nds that asymmetric FOMC statements regarding the eco-
nomic outlook and likely policy responses have contained signi¯cant predictive power for
subsequent changes in the Federal funds target rate between 1984 and 2003. See also Lapp
and Pearce (2000).
4We do not study the more recent years as Rosa and Verga (2005) or Heinemann and
Ullrich (2005) are able to do. The bene¯t of our data-set is its richness: it includes statements
by many euro area central bankers, also those comments given in between Governing Council
meetings while Rosa and Verga (2005) and Heinemann and Ullrich (2005) only include the in-
troductory statements of the ECB president at the press conference following an ECB interest
rate decision.
2rate decisions. This means that there is little additional information in this type
of communication.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 outlines the
ordered probit model, while section 3 presents the data. Section 4 compares
both sets of models and section 5 considers the robustness of our ¯ndings. The
¯nal section o®ers our conclusions.
2 A Taylor rule model for interest rate decisions
The Taylor rule in its general form can be written as:5
i¤
t = ¼t + r¤ + ®1(¼t ¡ ¼¤) + ®2yt (1)
The rule models the policy interest rate (i¤
t) as a linear function of in°ation (¼t),
the equilibrium real interest rate (r¤), the di®erence between actual in°ation and
target in°ation (¼t¡¼¤) and the output gap yt. Since the ECB closely monitors
developments in the money supply (M3), we also include the di®erence between
actual money growth and its 'reference' level (mt ¡ m¤) in the Taylor rule:
i¤
t = ¼t + r¤ + ®1(¼t ¡ ¼¤) + ®2yt + ®3(mt ¡ m¤) (2)
A ¯nancial analyst who wants to predict ECB interest rate decisions could
estimate equation (2) using data on in°ation, the output gap and the money
supply. Alternatively, she may use the information which is contained in the
communicated interpretation of these data series by the central bank. Both
these approaches will be compared in the remainder of this paper.
5Taylor (1993) originally proposed the following rule to describe Federal Reserve policy:
it = ¼t + 0:5yt + 0:5(¼t ¡ 2) + 2 where it represents the federal funds rate, ¼t the in°ation
rate, yt the percent deviation of real GDP from a target. The coe±cients on y and ¼ as well
as the equilibrium real interest rate of 2% were postulated rather than estimated.
3There are several issues that need to be addressed when taking the Taylor
rule to the data. First, as stressed by Orphanides (2001), data should be used
which was actually available at the time of the interest rate decisions. Therefore,
our macroeconomic data is taken from issues of the ECB's Monthly Bulletin (as
in Coenen, Levin, and Wieland (2005)) and publications by Consensus Forecast.
Second, there is the issue of using backward-looking or forward-looking informa-
tion. We take an agnostic view on this issue. Backward-looking information may
be an important input in the decision-making process as it presents the most
recent information on the state of the economy. On the other hand, since the
ECB aims at ensuring price stability in the medium run, it acts forward-looking.
Because of these reasons, we use both backward-looking (HICP ¯gures, output
gap estimates) and forward-looking (in°ation expectations, con¯dence indica-
tors) macroeconomic variables. Third, the variables used should be stationary.6
As in some cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variables are I(1),
we use the di®erenced version of equation (2):
¢i¤
t = (1 + ®1)¢¼t + ®2¢yt + ®3¢mt (3)
Most importantly, we take into account that ECB interest rate setting is a
discrete rather than a continuous process by using an ordered probit model.7
Building on (3) we postulate the following index function:
¢i¤
t = (1 + ®1)¢¼t + ®2¢yt + ®3¢mt + ²t (4)
where ¢i¤
t is now a latent continuous random variable representing the preferred
change in the ECB main re¯nancing rate. The actual interest rate decision ¢it
is represented as a ternary variable which has the value 0 if interest rates are
6See also Hu and Phillips (2004).
7A similar approach to modeling interest rate policy is used in Lapp, Pearce, and Laksana-
sut (2003) and Gerlach (2004).
4kept constant, +1 if interest rate policy is tightened, and -1 if interest rate policy
is eased. Interest rate policy is characterized by threshold behaviour: the main
re¯nancing rate is only changed if the value of the index function is either lower
than a lower threshold ¿1 or higher than an upper threshold ¿2. Both ¿1 and ¿2
are unobserved. Assuming that ²t follows a standard normal distribution, we
can write the probabilities of the di®erent outcomes as:
Pr[¢it = ¡1jzt] = ©(¿1 ¡ z
0
t¯)
Pr[¢it = 0jzt] = ©(¿2 ¡ z
0
t¯) ¡ ©(¿1 ¡ z
0
t¯)
Pr[¢it = 1jzt] = 1 ¡ ©(¿2 ¡ z
0
t¯)
where © denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and zt is a vec-
tor with explanatory variables. The ordered probit model is estimated using
maximum likelihood procedures (see Maddala (1983)).
We ¯rst estimate the ordered probit model using various proxies for the
macroeconomic variables (i.e. ¢¼t;¢yt and ¢mt). Next, we estimate the model
using the interpretation of developments in these variables signaled by euro area
central bankers. For each of the macroeconomic series, we substitute a signal






t + ²t (5)
where S¼
t denotes the ECB signal on in°ation, S
y
t denotes the signal on eco-
nomic growth, and Sm
t denotes the signal on M3, and ²t » N(0;1). Finally, we
expand the analysis by taking into account that the ECB may also send direct
signals on its next interest rate decision. We do so by estimating a model which
also incorporates a signal variable Si that is based on comments on the main







t + ²t (6)
53 Data
3.1 Macroeconomic data
For our backward-looking macroeconomic variables we use real-time monthly
data on euro area in°ation, industrial production (excluding construction) and
money growth as published in the ECB Monthly Bulletin.8 For in°ation, we use
the most recent value of the year-on-year change in HICP in°ation. For money
growth, we use the most recently reported value of the three-month moving
average of annualised growth in M3. We use the published series of industrial
production (excluding construction) to proxy the output gap yt. There are
only a limited number of monthly ¯gures reported in each Monthly Bulletin.
Therefore, we add historical Eurostat data for the months that are not reported,
starting in 1985:1. We calculate the output gap as the di®erence between the
natural logarithm of the index of industrial production (1995=100) and the
trend of this series, where we use a HP ¯lter with a smoothing parameter of
14,400 for de-trending.
To proxy in°ation expectations we use data from Consensus Economics.
Consensus surveys a number of ¯nancial institutions on a monthly basis asking
for the expected change in consumer prices in the current and the next year.
We use data for the eleven individual euro area countries that are surveyed.9
For month x of a given year t, we compute expected in°ation for each country
as [(13¡x)=12] times the in°ation forecast for the current year plus (1¡[(13¡
x)=12]) times the in°ation forecast for the next year. The national series are
aggregated with annually-updated real GDP weights into an expected in°ation
8As there were two interest rate decisions per month until November 2001, the monthly
values are, in most cases, used to explain two subsequent decisions.
9We include Greece beginning in 2002. Luxemburg is not included in the survey.
6series for the euro area. Usually, the survey is taken around the 10th of each
month and published with a short lag. Therefore, if the interest decision was
scheduled on or after the 15th of each month, we take the change in expectations
between the current month and the previous. Otherwise, we take the lagged
change.
The forward-looking output gap measure that we employ is based on the eco-
nomic sentiment indicator (ESI) published by the European Commission. Ger-
lach (2004) and Sauer and Sturm (2006) already established the usefulness of
the ESI in modeling ECB policy. The ESI is based on con¯dence indicators
for consumers, the retail sector, the construction sector and the manufacturing
sector. The data are obtained from the European Commission web-site.10 We
use the di®erence between the value of the ESI in a particular month and a
long-term average. The long-term average is calculated using a rolling window
consisting of the 144 preceding months.
3.2 Measuring communication
We obtained data on ECB communication by searching the Bloomberg news-
wire.11 The search was performed by scanning the news headlines for keywords
such as names of euro area central bankers (e.g. Duisenberg, Trichet, and Issing)
or issues related to monetary policy (i.e. in°ation, economic growth, M3, and
interest rates). Having collected the relevant reports, we coded each central
bank comment on a ternary scale (-1, 0, +1) re°ecting the direction in which the
central banker suggested that the variable was likely to develop. Table 1 gives
a number of examples of comments on the interest rate and our classi¯cation
10http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy ¯nance/indicators/business consumer sur-
veys/bcsseries en.htm.
11See Jansen and De Haan (2005b) for further details on our data.
7of these comments. Likewise, comments on lower (higher) levels of euro area
in°ation receive a -1 (+1), whereas statements with a positive (negative) outlook
for economic growth or comments hinting at higher (lower) M3 growth are coded
with the value +1 (-1).
We study the period from 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002, during which
the ECB took 75 interest rate decisions, the ¯rst on 7 January 1999, the last
on 2 May 2002. On 12 occasions interest rates were altered: there were 5
downward and 7 upward changes. Our sample period captures most of the
interest rate changes that the ECB has decided upon so far. Moreover, in this
period ¯nancial markets were still getting accustomed to the new central bank
so that communication was of paramount importance.
Searching Bloomberg, we found 925 reports containing comments by three
groups of central bankers, i.e. members of the ECB Executive Board (EB), na-
tional central bank (NCB) presidents, and high-level policymakers of the Bun-
desbank. That the words of high-level Bundesbank o±cials may be informative
is illustrated by the following quote from a ¯nancial analyst: `Bundesbank coun-
cil members are probably as close as one can get to being a °y on the ECB's
wall'(Bloomberg, 1 August 2001).
The data-set contains 277 statements on interest rates, 394 on in°ation,
356 on economic growth and 98 on M3. EB members made 93 statements on
interest rates, 149 on in°ation, 157 on economic growth and 32 on M3. For NCB
presidents, these ¯gures are 135, 210, 174 and 49; for Bundesbank o±cials, the
¯gures are 49, 35, 25 and 17. Table 2 shows the percentage of statements in
each category per topic for the three groups of central bankers and for the full
sample. As may be expected, most statements on interest rates were neutral.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Finally, it seems that Bundesbank o±cials were less optimistic on growth, more
inclined to point towards rises in M3, and less neutral on interest rates.
Table 2: Ternary classi¯cation of ECB statements
Comment by:
All o±cials Executive Board NCB presidents BuBa¤
Comment on:
Interest rate
1 14.4 12.9 14.1 18.4
0 80.9 83.9 82.2 71.4
-1 4.7 3.2 3.7 10.2
In°ation
1 24.2 23.5 24.3 28.6
0 43.3 47.7 39.5 45.7
-1 32.5 28.9 36.2 25.7
Economic growth
1 75.4 82.8 72.4 52.0
0 10.1 7.0 12.1 16.0
-1 14.6 10.2 15.5 32.0
Money supply
1 29.6 31.3 24.5 41.2
0 37.8 37.5 40.8 29.4
-1 32.7 31.3 34.7 29.4
Notes: ¤ Bundesbank o±cials excluding the President.
The entries in this table are the percentages of the total number of statements per category
per group. The sample period is 4 January 1999 to 2 May 2002.
Our aim is to relate communication on monetary policy in the time span
between the interest rate meeting at time t¡1 and the decision at time t to this
latter decision. Therefore, we aggregate the coded statements over inter-meeting










where x may be either in°ation, economic growth, money growth or interest
10rates, n+
¿ denotes the number of statements with the value +1 on day ¿, n¡
¿
denotes the number of statements with the value -1, day ¿ = 1 refers to the
remainder of the day after the interest rate meeting at t ¡ 1, Tt denotes the
number of days in the event window, and Nt denotes the total number of com-
ments per topic for the event window related to the decision at time t. We
re-scale the expression using the average value of NT in the sample: NT. The
indicator S captures the balance between upward and downward signals whilst
at the same time correcting for the total number of comments and the number
of days in the event window.
Figure 1 shows the four communication variables (bars) and the ECB main
re¯nancing rate (solid line). The latter is taken from the ECB web-site.12 A
casual inspection of the graphs shows that in three cases the signal variables
closely follow actual ECB interest rate policy. For in°ation, M3 growth, and
interest rates, we observe positive signals between mid 1999 and the beginning
of 2001 when the ECB tightened policy a number of times. For the last part of
the sample period during which the ECB reduced interest rates the signals are
mainly negative. However, statements on economic growth are hardly related
to interest rate decisions. Table 2 already indicated that comments on economic
growth were positive most of the time. This suggests that this indicator is not
a good predictor of actual ECB policy.
4 Results for the ordered probit models
Table 3 shows the estimation results for ¯ve ordered probit models of interest
rate decisions. Columns 1 and 2 present the outcomes using backward-looking


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12variables (in°ation, industrial production, and M3 growth). Column 3 shows
estimates employing forward-looking variables (in°ation expectations and the
ESI), while columns 4 and 5 contain results using ECB communication variables.
The two models based on communication variables have the best ¯t. If we
include signals on in°ation, economic growth, and M3, we ¯nd a pseudo-R2 of
0.15 (column 4). If we include the direct signal on the interest rate, the pseudo-
R2 rises to 0.20. In contrast, the two models using backward-looking variables
have a very poor ¯t. Including data on HICP, industrial production, and M3
results in a ¯t of 0.07 (column 1). None of these variables are signi¯cant at the
10% level. When we drop the M3 variable the pseudo-R2 drops to 0.04, but the
in°ation variable becomes signi¯cant at the 10% level with a point estimate of
1.29. The ¯t of the Taylor rule estimated with forward-looking variables lies
between the other four models. The coe±cients of expected in°ation and the
economic sentiment indicator are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
Table 4 reports marginal e®ects for four speci¯cations: two using macro-
economic data and two using communication variables.13 We ¯nd particularly
strong results for the forward-looking macroeconomic variables. A 1%-point in-
crease in our measure of in°ation expectations leads to an increase in the prob-
ability of higher interest rates of 0.56. For the measure based on the economic
sentiment indicator a 1%-point increase leads to a 0.39 rise in the probability
of higher interest rates and reduces the probability of a rate reduction by 0.23.
Also, we ¯nd that a 1%-point increase of realized HICP in°ation increases the
probability of a higher interest rate by 0.20. The e®ects of the communication
variables are smaller in absolute terms: a 1-point higher signal on euro area in-
13In the remainder of the paper, we no longer report results for the model including changes

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14°ation decreases the probability of a policy easing by 0.01, while a 1-point higher
signal on the main re¯nancing rate increases the likelihood of tighter policy by
0.02. The fact that the marginal e®ects for the communication variables are
smaller may be due to di®erent scales of measurement.
Which of these models is better suited to predict the next interest rate de-
cision? To answer this question, we use rolling-window out-of-sample forecasts.
We start by estimating each model using the ¯rst 25 observations and then gen-
erate the probability that each model attaches to a decision of higher, constant,
or lower interest rates at t = 26. Next, we re-estimate the models using the ¯rst
26 observations and predict the decision at t = 27, and so on. In general, the
models give accurate predictions in cases when rates were left unchanged. That
is to say, the probability of constant interest rates is equal to or larger than 50%
in most of these cases. Only in 5% of the cases do we ¯nd a predicted change
when actually no change took place.
However, the models have great di±culty in predicting interest rate changes.
Figure 2 summarizes the key results. For each decision point, the ¯gure shows
the probability that the models attach to a decision for either higher (top panel)
or lower interest rates (bottom panel) at time t. The top panel focuses on the
period during which the ECB tightened policy, while the bottom panel focuses
on the period during which monetary policy was eased. The timing of the
interest rate changes is denoted by the bars. The ¯gure shows that the models
fail to generate a probability of change of at least 50% in all cases when rates
were actually changed. The closest prediction is for 27 April 2000 when both
models based on communication generate a probability of higher rates of 34%.
There is no clear ranking for the models in terms of ability to predict changes











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16tighten policy the model with backward-looking macroeconomic data is most
accurate in three of the six cases. However, for decisions to ease policy it is
least accurate in two out of four cases. For both types of decisions, the model
with forward-looking variables gives the best prediction in four out of ten cases.
However, it gives the worst prediction in two cases and also incorrectly predicts
changes in the policy rate on two occasions. In ¯ve out of ten cases, one of
the communication-based models gives the best prediction. However, in the
other cases, these models generate the worst prediction. Additionally, both
communication models incorrectly predict three changes in the policy rate.14
5 Robustness
We explored the robustness of the results in several directions.15 First, we re-
estimated the ordered probit models using also lags of the explanatory variables.
Central bankers may signal rate changes earlier than in the inter-meeting period
which we use as the event window. Also, in setting the interest rate, they
may take lagged values of the macroeconomic variables into account. However,
including more lags does not change our main results. Most importantly, we are
unable to substantially improve the forecasting ability of the models.
Second, we considered whether allowing for interest rate smoothing may
14The decision to lower rates by 50 basis points on 17 September 2001 was unscheduled. It
came in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. In this individual
case, the results may be biased in favor of the communication-based models. After such an
event, communication will adjust more quickly and be more readily available than forward-
looking variables.
15We only describe the results of these extensions in broad terms here. Detailed results are
available on request from the corresponding author.





































Higher rates Macro data (backward) Macro data (forward) Communication 1 Communication 2

































Lower rates Macro data (backward) Macro data (forward) Communication 1 Communication 2
10 May `01 30 Aug `01 17 Sep `01 8 Nov `01
The vertical axis denotes the probability of either higher (top panel) or lower interest rates
(bottom panel). The lines represent the four models discussed in the text. The bars denote
the time of interest rate changes.
18in°uence the results. We implemented this by including lagged values of the
interest rate decision ¢it into the model. However, this adjustment also did not
improve the ability of the models to predict interest rate changes, although in
some cases the lagged decisions were signi¯cant.
Third, we considered an alternative weighting scheme for the communication
indicator variables. Comments made closer to meetings may be more important
as they are based on more as well as more recent information. Therefore, we
re-calculated the signal variables by weighing them by the distance (measured
in days) to the next decision. However, this also did not improve the predictive
power of the models based on communication.16
Finally, in order to check whether it is appropriate to include comments by
high-level o±cials of the Bundesbank we created separate signal variables for
this group of central bankers. It turned out that the communication variables
are signi¯cant in the ordered probit model which suggests that including Bun-
desbank statements is justi¯ed. An earlier version of this paper (Jansen and De
Haan (2005a)) provides a further discussion on this issue.
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied the predictability of ECB interest rate decisions based
on ECB communication and macroeconomic data. We ¯nd that decisions are
most closely linked to changes in in°ation expectations and economic sentiment.
However, comments by euro area central bankers on the main re¯nancing rate
and future in°ation are also helpful in modeling interest rate decisions. At the
16An additional extension could be using only those comments which led to signi¯cant
changes in prices of ¯nancial assets. This would help to identify those comments which were
considered informative by ¯nancial market participants.
19same time, we ¯nd no great di®erence in the predictive power of models based
on communication and macroeconomic data. In general, the models have great
di±culty in explaining changes in the main re¯nancing rate. However, decisions
to leave rates unchanged are usually correctly predicted. Our results di®er
from Rosa and Verga (2005) who ¯nd that statements by the ECB president at
the press conference following an interest rate decision have predictive power,
even if Taylor-rule like variables are included. This suggests that di®erent chan-
nels of central bank communication may not be equally informative.
Finally, how time-dependent are our conclusions? We have studied the early
years of the Economic and Monetary Union when the ECB had just begun its
operations. Possibly, communication has become more informative over time.
On the other hand, the ECB is still a relatively young institution which faces the
continuous challenge of explaining monetary policy to a diverse audience. There
are various indications that ¯nancial markets are still struggling to determine
what role di®erent types of economic data play in setting the ECB monetary
policy. For example, this topic often arises during Q&A sessions after ECB
interest rate decisions. Finding adequate ways to communicate on monetary
policy is therefore likely to remain one of the greatest challenges for the ECB
in the coming years.
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